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NOTES
THE EXCLUSION OF "APPARENT" MINERAL LEASES FROM
THE WARRANTY AGAINST EVICTION
A vendee purchased a tract of land under an act of sale containing
no general stipulation of nonwarranty. Numerous inscriptions were
listed in the act of sale which-indicated extensive mineral activity, in-
cluding the sale of a mineral servitude on the tract. The purchaser made
no pre-sale inspection but later discovered that the tract was being ex-
ploited for oil and gas pursuant to a mineral lease which had not been
listed in the act of sale. Asserting that extensive mineral operations on a
large portion of the tract rendered the property useless for any other pur-
pose, the purchaser brought an action against his vendor claiming a
breach of the warranty against eviction because of the vendor's failure to
declare the existence of the mineral lease in the act of sale., The Louisi-
ana Supreme Court held that the presence of drilling equipment and
structures used in mineral operations as visible evidence of a mineral
lease prevented the purchaser who made no pre-sale inspection from re-
covering from his vendor who failed to disclose the existence of the min-
eral lease. Richmond v. Zapata Development Corporation, 350 So. 2d 875
(La. 1977).
The warranty against eviction and appropriate remedial actions
originated in the Roman law.2 If evicted from the property, the vendee
1. Subsequent to the filing of plaintiff's petition, defendant filed exceptions of no
cause of action and prescription, and a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed no
opposing affidavits demonstrating the existence of a material factual dispute, and the dis-
trict court rendered summary judgment for defendant. The court found that the defendant
did not warrant the property sold to be free of oil and gas exploration because of the
numerous paragraphs in the deed suggestive of mineral activity, especially paragraph (k),
which disclosed a 1971 sale of all mineral rights on the property. The court of appeal
affirmed, holding that plaintiff had been apprised by the inscriptions recited in the deed
which contained facts sufficient to provoke an examination of the title before purchasing.
Richmond v. Zapata Development Corp., 339 So. 2d 939 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976), af4
350 So. 2d 875 (La. 1977).
2. 3 P. COLQUHOUN, A SUMMARY OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW 405-10 (1854); M.
KASER, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 178-80 (2d ed. R. Dannenbring trans. 1968); F. MACK-
ELDEY, HANDBOOK OF THE ROMAN LAW 318 (M. Dropsie trans. 1883); J. MOYLE, THE
CONTRACT OF SALE IN THE CIVIL LAW 111-12 (1892); J. MUIRHEAD, AN OUTLINE OF
ROMAN LAW 154 (1947); F. SHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 533-35 (1951); A. WATSON,
ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 61-62 (1971). The supporting principle was that in exchange for the
price the vendor's primary duty was to provide the vendee with undisturbed possession of
the property. H. RoBY, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 142 (1902). The vendor was thus obliged to
defend the vendee against eviction by a third party and was afforded such an opportunity
was allowed to recover damages and restitution of the price from the
vendor for breach of the contract of sale and warranty against eviction.3
Although an express warranty against eviction was customarily stipu-
lated in every contract of sale, the stipulation gradually became implied.
4
However, if no express stipulation of warranty existed in the contract of
sale and the vendee had knowledge of the doubtful nature of the right
which he purchased, i.e. of the danger of eviction, he was deprived of all
claims against the vendor. 5 In such a case the vendee was considered to
have renounced tacitly all claims against the vendor for subsequent evic-
tion.6
The influence of Roman law concepts is evident in French law
which has more fully developed the warranty against eviction and more
clearly defined the rights and obligations of the vendor and vendee. In
France the vendor is obliged to warrant the vendee against eviction from
sources not declared at the time of the sale.7 The vendor may insert a
general stipulation of nonwarranty in the contract of sale8 in which case
the vendor is relieved of paying damages to an evicted purchaser but he
must nevertheless restore the price.9 In such cases, however, if the pur-
chaser had knowledge of the danger of eviction at the time of the sale,
under the law. J. MOYLE, supra, at 118; Comment, Warranty Against Eviction in the Civil
Law.- Extent ofthe Vendee's Recovery, 23 TUL. L. REV. 140, 141 (1948) [hereinafter cited as
Extent of the Vendee's Recover).
3. Comment, Extent of the Vendee's Recovery, supra note 2, at 131.
4. J. MOYLE, supra note 2, at 112; Comment, Extent ofthe Vendee's Recovery, supra
note 2, at 141.
5. J. MOYLE, supra note 2, at 123; Comment, Warranty Against Eviction in the Civil
Law.- Limitations on the Extent o Vendee's Recovery, 23 TUL. L. REV. 154, 156 (1948) [here-
inafter cited as Limitations on RecoverA.
6. Id
7. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 1626; 2 A. COLIN ET H. CAPITANT, COURs ELEMENTAIRE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIs 81 (8th ed. Center of Civil Law Studies trans. 1935); 2 M.
PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW § 1494 (La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959); R. POTHIER,
TREATISE ON CONTRACTS: CONTRACT OF SALE § 194 (L.S. Cushing trans. 1839). Two basic
obligations of the vendor arise when the vendee is evicted from the property: the first is to
restore the price and the second is to reimburse the vendee for all damages caused by the
eviction. Comment, Extent ofthe Vendee's Recovery, supra note 2, at 142; See A. COLIN ET
H. CAPITANT, supra, at 89-95. The obligation to restore the price results from the failure of
cause which renders the obligation a nullity. R. POTHIER, supra, § 186.
8. A. COLIN ET H. CAPITANT, supra note 7, at 101; R. POTHIER, supra note 7, § 182.
The parties may also insert special nonwarranty clauses concerning a particular danger of
eviction which have the effect of a general nonwarranty clause as to the particular danger
mentioned in the act of sale. A. COLIN ET H. CAPITANT, supra note 7, at 101; R. POTHIER,
supra note 7, § 183; Comment, Limitations on Recovery, supra note 5, at 158.
9. FR. CIv. CODE art. 1629; A. COLIN ET H. CAPITANT, supra note 7, at 101; R.
POTHIER, supra note 7, § 186; Comment, Limitations on Recovery, supra note 5, at 157.
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the vendor is relieved of any obligation resulting from the eviction.' 0 In
the absence of a stipulation of nonwarranty, the vendor is bound under
the general warranty provisions," and must restore the price even
though knowledge of the danger of eviction will prevent the purchaser
from recovering damages.' 2
French authorities have interpreted article 1638 of the French Civil
Code as limiting the application of the warranty against eviction to those
charges against the land which are nonapparent and not declared in the
contract of sale.' 3 Thus an exception to the general rule of warranty has
been traditionally recognized where the source of eviction is an apparent
servitude.' 4 The distinction between the rule for visible or apparent ser-
vitudes and that for nonapparent charges was explained by Pothier, who
observed that the kind of real charges against which the purchaser can-
not claim warranty consists of the visible servitudes such as those of light
and eaves-dropping. No injustice results to the purchaser who is unpro-
tected against these charges "since in visiting the house before purchas-
ing it, he cannot avoid seeing the windows or the eaves." 15 Pothier
distinguished the visible servitude from the champart, a type of rental
arrangement often requiring payment of a portion of the produce,' 6 and
noted that a purchaser could have knowledge of this type of charge only
if he was informed of it.17
Although the visibility of the charge was emphasized, it is important
to note that the visible servitudes discussed by Pothier were predial servi-
tudes, consisting of a duty owed by one estate to a neighboring estate and
remaining with the land regardless of changes of ownership. In viewing
land burdened with a champart or other type of lease, a purchaser may
observe mere evidence of the right's existence. However, a purchaser ob-
serving a visible predial servitude, in addition to seeing physical evi-
dence of the exercise of a right, would also be apprised of the legal status
10. FR. Civ. CODE art. 1629; A. COLIN ET H. CAPITANT, supra note 7, at 101; Com-
ment, Limitations on Recovery, supra note 5, at 159.
11. FR. CIv. CODE art. 1626.
12. A. COLIN ET H. CAPITANT, supra note 7, at 103; M. PLANIOL, supra note 7, §§
1504, 1509; Comment, Limitations on Recovery, supra note 5, at 160, 161, 169. The pur-
chaser is denied damages through an extension of the principle announced in FR. CIVIL
CODE art. 1599 (LA. Civ. CODE art. 2452) which denies damages to a purchaser who knew
the property was not owned by the vendor.
13. A. COLIN ET H. CAPITANT, supra note 7, at 82-83; M. PLANIOL, supra note 7,
§§ 1493, 1495; R. POTHIER, supra note 7, § 194.
14. See authorities cited in note 13, supra.
15. R. POTHIER, supra note 7, § 200.
16. Id § 201.
17. Id
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of the right flowing from the physical relationship which exists between
two neighboring estates. This distinction is essential in order to define
the precise limits of the exception. It follows that only a predial servitude
can correctly be termed apparent and included in the exception to war-
ranty.
Application of the warranty against eviction in Louisiana closely re-
sembles French treatment. Under article 250118 of the Louisiana Civil
Code, the vendor is obliged to warrant the purchaser against eviction
from charges not declared at the time of the sale.' 9 Relying on article
2505,20 Louisiana courts have held that if the contract of sale contains a
general stipulation of nonwarranty, the purchaser may not recover dam-
ages but is nevertheless entitled to a restitution of the price.2 ' Under such
a contract, however, if the purchaser had knowledge of the danger of
eviction he may recover neither damages22 nor a restitution of the
price.2 3 In cases where the contract of sale contained no general stipula-
tion of nonwarranty, knowledge of the danger of eviction has prevented
recovery of damages caused by the eviction, 24 but the purchaser has nev-
ertheless recovered the price.25
Relying on the French authorities 26 and article 2515,27 Louisiana
18. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2501: "Although at the time of the sale no stipulations have
been made respecting the warranty, the seller is obliged, of course, to warrant the buyer
against the eviction suffered by him from the totality or part of the thing sold, and against
the charges claimed on such thing, which were not declared at the time of the sale."
19. Comment, Limitations on Recovery, supra note 5, at 163; see O'Reilly v. Poche, 162
So. 2d 787 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Lear v. John, 6 La. App. 197 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1927).
20. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2505: "Even in case of stipulation of no warranty, the seller, in
case of eviction, is liable to a restitution of the price, unless the buyer was aware, at the
time of the sale, of the danger of eviction, and purchased at his peril and risk."
21. Berry v. Garrett, 17 La. App. 262, 131 So. 475 (1930), aft'd on rehearing 17 La.
App. 262, 135 So. 701 (1931); Montgomery v. Marydale Land and Lumber Co., 46 La.
Ann. 403, 15 So. 63 (1894); Sewall v. Roach, 5 La. Ann. 683 (1850); Bowles v. Alfred, 5 La.
Ann. 667 (1850).
22. See note 12, supra.
23. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2505.
24. See note 12, supra.
25. Scott v. Featherston, 5 La. Ann. 306 (1850); Hall v. Nevill, 3 La. Ann. 326 (1848).
See Comment, Limitations on Recovery, supra note 5, at 169-70. But see Culver v. Culver,
188 La. 716, 178 So. 252 (1937) (criticized in Comment, Limitations on Recovery, supra note
5, at 170).
26. See authorities cited in note 13, supra.
27. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2515: "If the inheritance sold be incumbered with nonapparent
servitudes, without any declaration having been made thereof, if the servitudes be of such
importance that there is cause to presume that the buyer would not have contracted, if he
had been aware of the incumbrance, he may claim the canceling of the contract, should he
not prefer to have an indemnification."
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courts have ruled that a vendor of immovable property does not warrant
against evictions caused by the existence of apparent servitudes on the
land. In Lallande v. Wentz, 28 the vendee sought to avoid payment of the
purchase price because a public levee built pursuant to the levee servi-
tude covered a large portion of the land. The vendee was denied recov-
ery on the ground that the levee servitude should be considered an
apparent servitude against which the vendor does not warrant. Citing
Lallande, the court in James v. Buchert29 refused recovery to a purchaser
who was evicted from a portion of the tract through the existence of a
servitude of passage granted to the neighboring landowner by the ven-
dor. In each of these cases the apparent servitude serving as the source of
eviction was a predial servitude and the court's treatment of the excep-
tion was consistent with Pothier's explanation.
In the instant case, without making a pre-sale inspection the vendee
purchased a tract of land under an act of sale containing no general stip-
ulation of nonwarranty. 30 Numerous charges on the land indicating ex-
tensive mineral activity were listed in the act of sale,3' including a
mineral servitude established in 1971.32 However, the vendor failed to
declare the existence of an outstanding mineral lease granted in 1930
which was the source of substantial mineral operations causing vendee's
eviction from a large portion of the property. 33
Although the charges listed in the act of sale were sufficient to alert
the vendee to the danger of eviction, the court reasoned that this knowl-
edge did not bar an action for return of the purchase price because the
act of sale did not contain a nonwarranty clause. 34 The court noted,
however, that Louisiana has long recognized the view expressed by
French jurists that a vendor of immovable property does not warrant
against evictions resulting from the existence of apparent servitudes.
35
Relying on the great emphasis French authorities gave to the visibility of
the charge rather than its legal classification, and on the shared charac-
teristics of mineral leases and mineral servitudes in Louisiana, the court
derived the rule that a vendee of immovable property should not recover
for evictions caused by a mineral lease if there are ample visible signs of
28. Lallande v. Wentz, 18 La. Ann. 289 (1866).
29. James v. Buchert, 144 So. 2d 435 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
30. Richmond v. Zapata Development Corp., 350 So. 2d 875, 876 (1977).
31. Id
32. Id
33. Id at 877.
34. Id at 879.
35. Id
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its existence on the property. 36
In extending the exception to include mineral leases, the court relied
in part on the similarity between mineral leases and mineral servitudes. 37
Since the commencement of extensive oil and gas operations in Louisi-
ana the mineral lease has been given many of the characteristics of a
servitude. 38 Both the mineral lease and the mineral servitude include the
right to explore, develop, and produce minerals, to reduce them to pos-
session, and to assert title to a specified portion of production.39 Both the
mineral servitude and the mineral lease are classified as real rights.4
Limiting the primary term of a mineral lease to ten years is further indi-
cation of a desire to treat the mineral lease in a manner consistent with
the treatment given the mineral servitude.41 Since the court placed pri-
mary emphasis on the visibility of the charge, and since mineral opera-
tions pursuant to either a mineral servitude or a mineral lease would be
equally visible, the court concluded that if the mineral servitude, as an
apparent servitude, is included within the exception, the mineral lease
should also be included. 42
In an effort to transcend traditional legal classifications and to treat
the mineral servitude and the mineral lease in the same manner, the
court assumed without discussion, although no case has so held, that the
mineral servitude is an apparent servitude and should be excluded from
the warranty of the vendor when there is ample visible evidence of its
existence. However, it should be noted that the mineral servitude is not
among the predial servitudes included by Pothier in the exception to
warranty.43 In Louisiana the mineral servitude has been designated a
36. Id at 880.
37. Id
38. LA. R.S. 31:16 (Supp. 1974) (comment): "The mineral lease has long been subject
to the registry laws. LA. R.S. 9:2721-24 (1950). See article 18 of the Mineral Code. It has
been subject to assertion and defense as a real right by use of the real actions, LA. R.S.
9:1105 (1950); La. Code of Civil Procedure art. 3664 (1960). It has been subject to mortgage
as a corporeal immovable, LA. R.S. 9:5101 (1950), now Articles 203 and 204 of the Mineral
Code. It has been given protection in the event of partition by licitation, La. Civil Code
Art. 741 (1870 as amended), now Articles 178-187 of the Mineral Code."
39. See id
40. LA. R.S. 31:16 (Supp. 1974): "The basic mineral rights that may be created by a
landowner are the mineral servitude, the mineral royalty, and the mineral lease. This
enumeration does not exclude the creation of other mineral rights by a landowner. Mineral
rights are real rights and are subject either to the prescription of nonuse for ten years or to
special rules of law governing the terms of their existence."
41. LA. R.S. 31:115 (Supp. 1974).
42. 350 So. 2d at 880.
43. R. POTHIER, supra note 7, § 200. The servitudes of light and eavesdropping are
specifically mentioned.
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real right in the nature of a limited personal servitude rather than a pre-
dial servitude.44 The mineral servitude is considered a real right because
it does not terminate with the death of the person in whose favor it is
granted. Nevertheless, because the mineral servitude is due to a person
rather than a dominant estate it is termed a personal servitude rather
than a predial servitude.
In light of the basic nature of the mineral servitude, the court has
misinterpreted the concept of visibility as formulated by the French au-
thorities and has assumed erroneously that the mineral servitude should
be considered an apparent servitude. Although predial servitudes are
susceptible of designation as apparent or nonapparent, 45 personal servi-
tudes cannot be so classified. A purchaser viewing land burdened by an
apparent predial servitude is at that moment apprised of its legal status,
i.e. that an obligation exists between specific neighboring estates. How-
ever, in observing mineral operations pursuant to a mineral servitude, a
purchaser cannot without referring to the public records46 ascertain
whether operations are being conducted by the landowner, a servitude
owner, a mineral lessee, or anyone who has been granted such a right by
contract with the party holding the executive right. No specific legal rela-
tionship is made apparent by physical evidence of mineral operations on
the land. Therefore, neither the mineral servitude nor the mineral lease
should be excluded from the warranty of the vendor, even where there is
ample physical evidence of their existence. The exclusion of apparent
servitudes from warranty should be limited to predial servitudes as envi-
44. See e.g., Gayoso Co. v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 176 La. 333, 145 So. 677
(1933); Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931); Palmer Corp. of Louisiana v.
Moore, 171 La. 774, 132 So. 229 (1930); Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150
La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922). See Hardy, The Birth of Louisiana Mineral Law, 16 Loy. L.
REV. 299, 326, 342 (1970); Sachse, The Needfor Statutory Guidance in Louisiana Mineral
Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 798, 801 (1962); Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes,- General Principles
Louisiana and Comparative Law, 29 LA. L. REV. 1 (1968).
45. LA. CIv. CODE art. 728: "Again, servitudes are either visible and apparent or non-
apparent. Apparent servitudes are such as are to be perceivable by exterior works; such as a
door, a window, an aqueduct.
Nonapparent servitudes are such as have no exterior sign of their existence; such, for
instance, as the prohibition of building on an estate, or of building above a particular
height."
46. In consideration of the limited scope of this Note, no attempt will be made to
discuss the important policy questions presented by the court's reliance on a somewhat ill-
defined concept of visibility rather than applying the public records doctrine to prevent the
vendee from bringing an action under the warranty against eviction in cases where the sale
of land is by warranty deed.
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sioned by French authorities and as previously applied in Louisiana
cases.
Through the misapplication of the concept of visibility of legal rela-
tionships, and the resulting inclusion of the mineral servitude and the
mineral lease in the exception to warranty, there is danger that the war-
ranty provisions will be further weakened. The mineral lease continues
to share many of the characteristics of an ordinary lease, and the courts
have continued in proper cases to apply to mineral leases the Civil Code
articles governing ordinary leases, notwithstanding the designation of the
mineral lease as a real right.47 Since Zapata extends the traditional ex-
ception to include one type of lease arrangement, there is no conceptual
obstacle to further extension which would exclude other visible encum-
brances from the warranty of the vendor.
Although the court reached the correct conclusion under the facts of
the instant case, its analysis could yield undesirable results in future
cases. There is, however, an alternative which would provide an equita-
ble solution and eliminate the conceptual difficulties should the court
desire to distinguish the case from similar cases in the future. At the time
of the sale both a mineral lease and a mineral servitude had been estab-
lished on the tract. Although the vendor failed to list the outstanding
mineral lease in the act of sale,48 he did declare an outstanding mineral
servitude on the tract.49 Under the Louisiana Mineral Code, the mineral
servitude owner enjoys the right to explore for and produce minerals,
including the right to lease the property for the production of minerals. 50
Thus, from the aggregate of the rights of the mineral servitude owner,
the mineral lease may be created, and the mineral servitude owner is
considered the mineral lessor.5 ' The very definition of the mineral lease
emphasizes its nature as contract. To declare the existence of the mineral
servitude is to declare the right and power of the servitude owner to ex-
ploit through any form of contract, and a declaration of all contracts
subordinate to the mineral servitude should not be required. Such a rule
would require the vendor to search the records to discover the various
contractual rights which have been granted by the mineral servitude
owner so that each might be listed in the act of sale and thereby excluded
47. Davis v. Laster, 242 La. 735, 138 So. 2d 558 (1962); La. Oil Refining Corp. v.
Cozart, 163 La. 90, 111 So. 610 (1927); Succession of Rugg, 339 So. 2d 519 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1976).
48. 350 So. 2d at 877.
49. Id
50. LA. R.S. 31:21 (Supp. 1974).
51. La. R.S. 31:116 (Supp. 1974) (comment): "[Ilt is proper to require that the mineral
lessor be one who is the owner of or has executive rights over the property being leased."
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from warranty. This is indeed an absurd result which could not possibly
have been intended; yet Zapata would seem to require vendors to list all
such contracts.
In the instant case, the outstanding mineral lease was created by the
landowner in 1930, forty-one years before the creation of the mineral
servitude. Nevertheless, the mineral servitude owner became the succes-
sor in interest of the landowner as to the minerals and the mineral lessor
as to the outstanding mineral lease at the time the mineral servitude was
created. Thus the source of the eviction was the outstanding mineral ser-
vitude from which flowed the mineral lessees's contractual right to con-
duct mineral operations.5 2 In future cases the court should find that in
listing the mineral servitude in the act of sale, the vendor is relieved of
any obligation in warranty for evictions caused by the exercise of con-
tractual rights subordinate to the mineral servitude.5 3
Zapata poses a threat to the warranty provisions of the Civil Code
by breaking down conceptual barriers to the extension of the exception
to warranty where apparent servitudes are the source of eviction. If fu-
ture purchasers of land are to be fully protected by warranty, the court
must re-evaluate its analysis of the function and scope of the traditional
exception to warranty.
Richard Keith Colvin
VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND INTENTIONAL TORTS: LeBrane Refined
Defendant, the president and majority stockholder of a closely held
corporation, purchased additional insurance on the life of the plaintiff, a
former vice-president of the corporation, and made the corporation the
beneficiary. Shortly thereafter, the defendant and two corporate employ-
ees brutally beat the plaintiff late one evening outside of his home. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeal held that the tortious acts were not com-
mitted during the course and scope of the defendant's employment. The
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and heldthat the defendant's actions
were in large part motivated by his desire to improve the corporation's
52. LA. R.S. 31:114 (Supp. 1974).
53. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2501.
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